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Abstract
We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the allo-
cation rule is given by the permission value. We focus on eﬃcient hierarchies,
namely those, for which the payoﬀ of the top agent is maximized. For additive
games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more productive agents oc-
cupy higher positions. The result can be extended to non-additive games with
appropriate restrictions on the value function. Finally, we consider auctions
where agents bid for positions in a two agent vertical hierarchy. Under simul-
taneous bidding, an equilibrium does not exist while sequential bidding always
results in a non-cogent hierarchy.
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1 Introduction
Myerson’s (1977) seminal paper introduced graph restricted cooperative games. Hi-
erarchical permission structures were introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink
(1992) which in addition to the graph also incorporated a dominance structure where
agents were in a superior-subordinate relationship with each other. The permission
value came in two flavours. In the case of the conjunctive permission value, each
agent required the permission of all his superiors in order to be productive. In the
case of disjunctive permission value, each agent required the permission of at least
one superior in order to be productive. Under special hierarchies called trees, the two
values coincided and could be simply referred to as the permission value.
We restrict ourselves to trees in this paper so we are only dealing with the per-
mission value. Consider a set of agents who are heterogeneous in the sense that as
singletons, they all produce diﬀerent values. Now, how they are assigned in the hi-
erarchy matters to the top agent (or agent who is superior to every other agent),
because his payoﬀ would change with each assignment. We find the interesting result
that for additive games, the assignment which maximizes his payoﬀ (which we call an
eﬃcient assignment) has more productive agents occupying higher positions in the
hierarchy. We call the latter a cogent assignment. The result can be extended to
non-additive games albeit with severe restrictions on the value function.
Finally, we study a simple two agent vertical hierarchy where positions are auc-
tioned. We derive the rather interesting result that in a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, a non-cogent assignment always results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the notation and
terminology. In Section 3, we derive the formula of the payoﬀ of the top agent for
additive games. Section 4 shows the equivalence of eﬃcient and cogent assignments
for additive games. Section 5 extends the result to non-additive games. Section 6
discusses auctioning of positions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
The hierarchy of a firm is described by a finite set of positions N and a set of directed
relations. The relational structure is determined by a map S : N → 2N which assigns
to each position p ∈ N a set of successor positions S(p). Hence the positions q ∈ S(p)
are the successor positions of p. The positions p ∈ S−1(q) are called the predecessor
positions of q. The collection of relational structures on the set of positions N is
denoted by SN .
For every relational structure S ∈ SN , we introduce its transitive closure by the
mapping bS : N → 2N . Hence for every position p ∈ N , we define q ∈ bS(p) if there
exists a sequence (h1, h2, . . . , hz) with h1 = p and hz = q and for every 1 6 k 6 z−1,
hk+1 ∈ S(hk). We call the positions in the collection bS(p) the subordinate positions
of p in the relational structure S. The set bS−1(p) = {q| p ∈ bS(q)} is called the set of
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superior positions of p. Next, BS = {p ∈ N | S−1(p) = ∅} is the set of top positions.
WS = {p ∈ N | S(p) = ∅} is the set of front positions in the structure S. The other
positions belonging to the set N\(BS ∪WS) are the intermediate positions.
Denote the cardinality of any arbitrary set A by |A|. A hierarchy is a forest if
|S−1(p)| = 1 for all p ∈ N\BS. It is a tree if additionally |BS| = 1. For a tree, the
positions at the lth level are members of a set Nl for l = 1, . . . ,m such that each
position has the same relational distance to the top level, namely,
¯¯¯ bS−1(p)¯¯¯ = l for
all p ∈ Nl. The set of levels are denoted by L = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}. Note that N0 = BS
and Nm ⊂WS. The level of a certain position p is given by L (p).
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig 1: Levels in a tree
A special kind of tree is an (m, s) regular hierarchy, or simply an (m, s)-hierarchy, if
there exists m, s ∈ R, such that |S (i)| = s for all i ∈ N\BS and
¯¯¯ bS−1 (i)¯¯¯ = m for all
i ∈WS. m is called the depth of the hierarchy and s is called the span of control. If
s = 1, we refer to the (m, s)-hierarchy as a vertical hierarchy.
We can extend these definitions to sets of positions rather than single positions.
Hence, denote for all E ⊂ N ,
bS (E) = [
p∈E
bS (p) .
Similarly, bS−1 (E) = [
p∈E
bS−1 (p) .
To denote a certain position, we will sometimes use a double-index notation. The
members of the set Nl are given by {pl,1, . . . , pl,|Nl|} for l = 1, . . . ,m where pl,1 indi-
cates the position at level l to the extreme left, pl,2 indicates the position next to pl,1,
and so forth with pl,|Nl| being the position at level l to the extreme right.
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The number of positions in a tree is given by
|N | =
mX
l=0
|Nl|
We denote by bSl(p) the set of subordinate positions of p at level l, namely, bSl(p) =bS(p) ∩Nl. For p ∈ Nl, ¯¯¯ bS(p)¯¯¯ = mX
j=l+1
¯¯¯ bSj(p)¯¯¯
A hierarchy is activated if some or all the positions are occupied by agents. LetM be
the set of occupied positions or interchangeably the set of agents occupying positions
in the hierarchy. We can define a TU cooperative game (N, v) where v : 2M → R
where denotes the characteristic function. v(E) is the maximum value achieved by a
coalition E ⊂M . For the rest of this paper, assume that all positions are filled, i.e.,
M = N .
For time being, we do not distinguish between agents themselves and the positions
they occupy. An agent is simply identified by its position. The distinction becomes
relevant only in Section 4.
Given a cooperative game, one can always define a Shapley value as a fair bar-
gaining solution. But one has to take into account the hierarchical structure. The
preferred way to incorporate the hierarchical structure in the literature is the method
introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) where it is assumed that each
agent needs the permission of all of his superiors in order to be productive.1 Based
on this, one can define a restrictive game,
RS(v)(E) = v(σ(E))
where σ(E) = E\bS(N\E) called the sovereign part of E. In other words, the
sovereign part excludes all players whose superiors lie outside the coalition E. We
also derive ζ(E) = E ∪ bS−1(E) as the authorizing set of E in S. Gilles and van den
Brink (1996) have shown that
Shp(RS(v)) =
X
E∈Γp
∆v(E)
|ζ(E)| (1)
where Sh = (Shp)p∈N denotes the vector of Shapley values, ∆v(E) is the Harsanyi
1Strictly speaking there are two distinct approaches.The conjunctive approach introduced by
Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) assumes that each agent needs the permission of all his
superiors in order to be productive. The disjunctive approach introduced by the same authors
assumes that each agent needs the permission of at least one superior in order to be productive. For
a tree, the two approaches are identical for obvious reasons.
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dividend of E defined by
∆v(E) =
X
F⊂E
(−1)|E|−|F |v(F ) and
Γp = {E ⊂ N |E ∩
hbS(p) ∪ {p}i 6= ∅}.
ϕp(v, S) = Shp(RS(v)) is called the permission value of the agent in the position p.
By applying the Möbius transformation, the following property is true of the
Harsanyi dividend that we shall use below.
v (E) =
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ) (2)
⇒ ∆v (E) = v (E)−
X
F(E
∆v (F ) . (3)
3 Additive Games
Previous studies of the permission value in hierarchies have considered homogeneous
agents or hierarchies where only the lowest level of the hierarchy is productive. For
instance, see Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992). In those models there is no
assignment problem. However, if we consider heterogeneous agents (that is, agents
that diﬀer in productivity), then we have an assignment problem because the place-
ment of the agent in a particular position aﬀects the payoﬀ of other agents in the
hierarchy. We consider the question of assignment only from the perspective of the
agent at the top position who can both decide which agent is placed in which position
and he chooses these placements to maximize his payoﬀ. The question then is what
kind of hierarchy would emerge.
We begin by identifying an agent called the top agent say p0,1, who always occupies
the top position and is unproductive but has a free hand in assigning agents to
positions. Let us consider an additive game where each agent p ∈ N\{p0,1} has a
productivity µp given by some real number. For sake of convenience, assume all these
productivities are distinct, namely, p 6= q ⇒ µp 6= µq. Hence, a natural order exists
with regard to these productivities, namely, the agents can be ranked based on their
productivity.
Hence,
v (E) =
X
p∈E
µp
with v (∅) = 0. Since both the characteristic function v as well as the relational
structure S is fixed, we shall not refer to them but denote the permission value
simply as ϕp.
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Proposition 1 Consider a tree and assume all positions are filled. Then the payoﬀ
of an agent at position p at level l is given by:
ϕp =
µp
l + 1
+
mX
k=l+1
X
q∈bSk(p)
µ µq
k + 1
¶
Proof. First we claim that for an arbitrary additive game v(E) =
P
p∈E
µp,
∆v(E) =
½
µp if E = {p};
0 otherwise.
We will prove this claim by induction. We begin with singleton coalitions. Obviously,
∆v({p}) = v ({p}) = µp.
Now consider two agent coalitions. We get using (3),
∆v({p, q}) = v ({p, q})− v ({p})− v ({q})
= µp + µq − µp − µq
= 0.
Suppose the result is true for all coalitions of size r. Consider a coalition of size
(r + 1), say E. Then applying (3), we get
∆v(E) = v (E)−
X
F(E
∆v (F )
= v (E)−
X
p∈E
∆v ({p})
=
X
p∈E
µp −
X
p∈E
µp
= 0.
This completes the proof.
Hence, from (1), we get that
ϕp =
X
{q}∈Γp
∆v({q})
|ζ({q})|
=
X
{q}∈Γp
µq
|ζ({q})| .
Now, the set of singletons belonging to Γp includes the player p and all her subordi-
nates bS(p). Any agent q at a level k has k superiors, namely,bS−1(q) = k.
6
Therefore, |ζ({q})| = k + 1. Define L(q) to be the level at which q exists. Hence,
ϕp =
X
{q}∈Γp
µq
L(q) + 1
.
Given that the set of subordinates p has at a certain level k is given by bSk(p) where
l < k 6 m, we get
ϕp =
µp
l + 1
+
mX
k=l+1
X
q∈bSk(p)
µ µq
k + 1
¶
.
We remark that the above proposition has been proved by Gilles, Owen and van
den Brink (1992) (p. 288). We reproduce the proof in a simpler way for the benefit
of the reader.
4 Cogent and Optimal Assignments
It is now necessary to distinguish an agent from the position it occupies. Agents are
indexed by i, j and positions by p, q. The set of agents are denoted by N and the set
of positions by N 0 with |N | = |N 0|. Productivity µi is associated with agent i rather
than a position p. Positions at a certain level l will now be denoted by N 0l .
An assignment is an allocation of a certain set of agents E ⊂ N to a certain
set of positions E0 ⊂ N 0 with one agent occupying one position, namely, |E| = |E0|.
We denote it by AE0,E. If E = N and E0 = N 0, then the assignment is complete.
Assignments will be generally denoted by calligraphic capital Latin letters. We will
also follow the convention of referring to sets of agents by capital Latin letters and
adding primes to denote sets of positions. Since the sets of positions as well as players
are obvious in a complete assignment, we will not refer to them but simply denote
the assignment by A.
Let the agent occupying the position p ∈ E0 under an assignment AE0,E is given
by iAE0,E (p). For a complete assignment A, we refer to it simply as iA (p).
Corresponding to any assignment AE0,E, for any strict subset F 0 ( E0, let F =
{iAE0,E (p) |p ∈ F 0}. Then the assignment that assigns agent iAE0,E (p) to all positions
p ∈ F 0 is called a subassignment of AE0,E to F 0 and is denoted by AF 0E0,E. If the initial
assignment is complete, we refer to it simply as AF .
The top agent is denoted by T . Payoﬀs of all agents including the top agent are a
function of the complete assignment. We next define cogent assignments and optimal
assignments.
Definition 1 A complete assignment A is cogent if more eﬃcient agents occupy
higher positions. Namely for any two levels l1 and l2, and two occupied positions
p ∈ N 0l1 and q ∈ N
0
l2, l1 > l2 ⇒ µiA(p) > µiA(q).
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Definition 2 A complete assignment A is optimal if no interchange of agents among
a set of positions can increase the payoﬀ of the top agent. Namely, for a set of
positions E0 ⊂ N 0 and E = {iA (p) |p ∈ E0}, consider an assignment BE0,E 6= AE0.
Then,
ϕT (A) > ϕT (B)
where B is the complete assignment that assigns agent iA (p) to all positions p ∈ N 0\E0
and agent iBE0,E(p) to all positions p ∈ E0.
Next, we come to the following result.
Proposition 2 A complete assignment is optimal if and only if it is cogent.
Proof. First, we will prove that an optimal assignment is necessarily cogent. Towards
a contradiction, consider a complete assignment A that is optimal but not cogent.
Then, there must be at least two positions p and q such that L (p) > L (q) but
µiA(p) > µiA(q). Consider an assignment that swaps these two agents in these positions
such that agent iA (p) is assigned to position q and agent iA (q) is assigned to position
p. Then, the payoﬀ of the top agent changes by
G =
µiA(p)
L (q) + 1
+
µiA(q)
L (p) + 1
−
µiA(p)
L (p) + 1
−
µiA(q)
L (q) + 1
=
¡
µiA(p) − µiA(q)
¢ · 1
L (q) + 1
− 1
L (p) + 1
¸
(4)
=
¡
µiA(p) − µiA(q)
¢
(L (p)− L (q))
(L (p) + 1) (L (q) + 1)
> 0.
This contradicts the fact that A is optimal.
Next, we will prove that any cogent assignment is optimal. Without loss of gen-
erality, let us rank the agents based on their productivity. Namely, µ1 > µ2 > µ3 >
· · · > µ|N |. Based on this we can identify an agent with her productivity. First
note that, using the double index notation introduced above, in all cogent assign-
ments, the set of agents {µτ+1, µτ+2, . . . , µτ+|N 0l |} occupy positions at level l given by
{pl,1, . . . , pl,|N 0l |} where τ =
|N 0l−1|X
k=1
|N 0k| ; in any particular order. In other words, the
diﬀerence between two arbitrary cogent assignments only involves a re-assignment of
agents among positions at the same level rather than between levels. Since such an
re-assignment does not change the payoﬀ of the top agent, all cogent assignments
result in the same amount of payoﬀ to the top agent. Given the fact that any optimal
assignment is cogent, this completes the proof.
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5 Extension to Non-Additive Games
Let us now consider the possibility of extending the above result to non-additive
games. The first question is how do we define productivity in the case of non-additive
games. If we simply denote it by the amount that an agent individually can produce,
namely, v ({i}), then it can be shown that in the general case, the result of Proposition
2 does not hold.
Example 1 Let v ({1}) = 5, v ({2}) = 3, v ({3}) = 1, v ({1, 2}) = 8, v ({1, 3}) =
6, v ({2, 3}) = 104, v ({1, 2, 3}) = 109 and the hierarchy in question is a vertical
hierarchy with depth 4. Then, the cogent assignment A is iA (pj,1) = j for j = 1, 2, 3.
The payoﬀ of the top agent in this hierarchy is
345
12
. However, consider the assignment
B such that iB (p1,1) = 2; iB (p2,1) = 3 and iB (p3,1) = 1. The payoﬀ of the top agent
increases to
437
12
.
The main hindrance to the result holding successfully is that an agent’s produc-
tivity may vary depending on what coalition he is part of. For instance, in Example 1,
agent 2 by himself is less productive than agent 1 but he makes a far greater marginal
contribution than agent 1 when in a coalition with agent 3.
Hence, we define a class of games where the notion of higher productivity remains
consistent irrespective of the coalition the agent is part of. Namely, for any coali-
tion E ⊂ N\{i, j}, v ({i}) > v ({j}) implies v (E ∪ {i}) > v (E ∪ {j}). In fact, we
introduce a stronger condition that implies the above.
Definition 3 A TU cooperative game (N, v) belongs to the class C∗ if v ({i}) >
v ({j}) implies ∆v (E ∪ {i}) > ∆v (E ∪ {j}) for all E ⊆ N\{i, j}.
The condition is trivially satisfied for additive games. It directly implies our
condition of consistent productivities.
Lemma 1 For a TU cooperative game in (N, v) in C∗, for any coalition E ⊂ N\{i, j},
v ({i}) > v ({j}) implies v (E ∪ {i}) > v (E ∪ {j}).
Proof. Using (2),
v (E ∪ {i}) =
X
F⊆E∪{i}
∆v (F )
= ∆v ({i}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ∪ {i}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F )
= v ({i}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ∪ {i}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ) .
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Also,
v (E ∪ {j}) =
X
F⊆E∪{j}
∆v (F )
= ∆v ({j}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ∪ {j}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F )
= v ({j}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ∪ {j}) +
X
F⊆E
∆v (F ) .
Given v ({i}) > v ({j}), and ∆v (F ∪ {i}) > ∆v (F ∪ {j}) for all F ⊆ E, the result
follows.
Given that we distinguish between agents and positions, there are two sets of
directed relations. One is a relation between agents and the other is a relation between
positions. The former changes while the latter remains unchanged when one re-assigns
agents among positions.
Let S : N → 2N denote the relationship between agents and correspondingly
S0 : N 0 → 2N 0 denote the relationship among positions. S0 is given exogenously while
S changes with every new assignment and is a function of the assignment. In the
figure below, S0 (p0,1) = p1,1 and S0 (p1,1) = p2,1. Now there are two assignments A
and B. SA (T ) = {1} and SA (1) = {2} while SB (T ) = {2} and SB (2) = {1}.
P0,1
P1,,1
P2,1
T
1
2
T
2
1
Figure 2: Assignments
A particularly neat way to avoid this rather cumbersome notation is to simply
permute the agents. Let π : N → N be a permutation of players. Then, if S is the
initial relational mapping in some assignment, this permutation automatically creates
a new assignment with a corresponding relational mapping π (S) where
π (S) (π (i)) = {π (j) ∈ N |j ∈ S(i)}
for each i ∈ N . The position of player π (i) = j in the new assignment is same as the
position of player i in the initial assignment. For instance, in going fromA to B in the
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figure above, the relevant permutation is π (1) = 2 and π (2) = 3. Thus, if we fix an
initial assignment, there is bijective relationship between the set of assignments and
the set of permutations and any assignment can be represented by a permutation. In
what follows, a hierarchy will be denoted by (N 0, S0) and the relational structure in an
assignment either by S (initial assignment) or by π (S) (the new assignment created
by a permutation). Other variables (such as the set ζ which is the set of agents and
their superiors) will be denoted by making reference to the relational structure of the
assignment rather than the assignment itself. Also, in a slight abuse of notation we
shall extend the notation π from individual players to coalitions of players. Namely,
for all E ⊆ N ,
π (E) = {π (i) |i ∈ E} .
Since each assignment is associated with an unique relational structure among players
(as opposed to positions), the terms assignment and relational structure will be used
interchangeably.
Lemma 2 Consider two assignments A and B with relational structures S and π (S)
respectively. Let bN = {i ∈ N |π (i) = i} and bbN = {i ∈ N |π (i) 6= i} .
(i) If E ⊆ bN , |ζS(E)| = ¯¯ζπ(S)(E)¯¯ .
(ii)If bbN ⊆ E, |ζS(E)| = ¯¯ζπ(S)(E)¯¯ .
Proof. We start with (i). Let E0 = {p ∈ N 0|iA(p) ∈ E}. Now, |ζS(E)| = |ζS0(E0)|.
Given that agents in E have not changed their positions, {p ∈ N 0|iB(p) ∈ E} = E0.
Hence,
¯¯
ζπ(S)(E)
¯¯
= |ζS0(E0)| . Hence, |ζS(E)| =
¯¯
ζπ(S)(E)
¯¯
.
Next, we come to (ii). Again, let E0 = {p ∈ N 0|iA(p) ∈ E}. Now, |ζS(E)| =
|ζS0(E0)|. This time while some agents in E have changed their positions, the changes
do not involve positions outside E0. Hence, again {p ∈ N 0|iB(p) ∈ E} = E0. Thus,¯¯
ζπ(S)(E)
¯¯
= |ζS0(E0)| . Hence, |ζS(E)| =
¯¯
ζπ(S)(E)
¯¯
.
Then, we have the following proposition as a direct consequence of Lemma 2.
Proposition 3 Consider two assignments A and B with relational structures S and
π (S) respectively such that π (i) = j and π (j) = i and π(k) = k for each k ∈ N such
that k 6= i, j. Then,
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B) =
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
[∆v(E)−∆v(π (E))]
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
.
Proof. From Lemma 2, for each E ⊆ N such that E ⊇ {i, j}, we have |ζS(E)| =
|ζπ(S)(E)|. For each E ⊆ N such that E ∩ {i, j} = ∅, we obtain the same result:
|ζS(E)| = |ζπ(S)(E)|. Then, the payoﬀ of the top agent as a result of this permutation
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changes by:
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B) =
X
E⊆N
∆v(E)
|ζπ(S)(E)|
−
X
E⊆N
∆v(E)
|ζS(E)|
=
X
E⊆N
i∈E
j/∈E
∆v(E)
|ζπ(S)(E)|
+
X
E⊆N
j∈E
i/∈E
∆v(E)
|ζπ(S)(E)|
−
X
E⊆N
i∈E
j/∈E
∆v(E)
|ζS(E)|
−
X
E⊆N
j∈E
i/∈E
∆v(E)
|ζS(E)|
=
X
E⊆N
i∈E
j/∈E
∆v(E)
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
+
X
E⊆N
j∈E
i/∈E
∆v(E)
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
=
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
∆v(E)
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
+
X
E=K∪{j}
K⊆N\{i,j}
∆v(E)
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
(5)
Now, for any coalition E = K ∪ {i}, where K ⊆ N\{i, j}, replacing i by j produces
π (E) = K∪{j}. Hence, there is a bijective relation between the set of coalitions given
byΩ = {E|E = K ∪ {i} with K ⊆ N\{i, j}} andΨ = {E|E = K ∪ {j} with K ⊆ N\{i, j}}
given by the function π : Ω→ Ψ. This implies we re-write (5) as follows:
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B)
=
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
"
∆v(E)
Ã
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
!
+∆v(π (E))
Ã
1
|ζπ(S)(π (E))|
− 1|ζS(π (E))|
!#
. (6)
Now, the set of positions occupied by players in the coalition E under the relational
structure S are occupied by the players in the coalition π (E), under the relational
structure π (S) and are given by, say, E0 = {p ∈ N 0|iA(p) ∈ E} = {p ∈ N 0|iB(p) ∈ π (E)}.
Therefore, it follows that |ζπ(S)(π (E))| = |ζS(E)| = |ζS0(E0)|. Hence, we can rewrite
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(6) as
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B)
=
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
"
∆v(E)
Ã
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
!
+∆v(π (E))
µ
1
|ζS(E)|
− 1|ζS(π (E))|
¶#
. (7)
Next, we shall show that |ζπ(S)(E)| = |ζS(π (E))|. E = K ∪ {i} for some K =
N\ {i, j}. π (E) = K ∪ {j}. First, consider the set of positions occupied by E in
the relational structure π (S). It is given by {p ∈ N 0|iB(p) ∈ K ∪ {i}} = M 0 (say).
Next, consider the set of positions occupied by π (E) in the relational structure S.
It is given by {p ∈ N 0|iA(p) ∈ K ∪ {j}} = L0. Since i occupies the same position in
assignment B as j occupies in assignment A, and the positions of players in the set
K are identical in both assignments, L0 = M 0, namely the set of positions occupied
by E in the relational structure π (S) is the same as the set of positions occupied by
π (E) in the relational structure S. Therefore, |ζπ(S)(E)| = |ζS(π (E))| = |ζS0(L0)|.
Hence, we can re-write (7) as
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B)
=
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
∆v(E)
"Ã
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
!
+∆v(π (E))
Ã
1
|ζS(E)|
− 1|ζπ(S)(E)|
!#
=
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
[∆v(E)−∆v(π (E))]
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
. (8)
The reader may verify that (8) morphs into (4), when we restrict ourselves to
additive games since non-singleton coalitions have a Harsayni dividend of zero.
Now, consider a coalition E in (8). Observe that if v ({i}) > v ({j}), then the
∆v(E) − ∆v(π (E)) is strictly positive for singleton coalitions and non-negative for
non-singleton coalitions if the game belongs to the class C∗. However, even if the
level occupied by player i in assignment A is greater than that occupied by player
j, the expression 1|ζπ(S)(E)| −
1
|ζS(E)| is not necessarily positive (or non-negative for
that matter) precluding the straight forward generalization of Proposition 2 to non-
additive games, as the following example demonstrates.
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Example 2 Consider the following assignment shown in the figure below.
T
5
7
9
2
4
8
6
3
Figure 3: Switching positions
Let π (2) = 6, π (6) = 2 and π (k) = k for k 6= 2, 6. For E = {2, 8}, π (E) = {6, 8}.
Hence,
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
=
1
6
− 1
5
= − 1
30
.
Only for special trees, namely, vertical hierarchies, is the aforesaid expression
always non-negative. This is proved in the next lemma. But before that let us
introduce the level of a player (as opposed to a position) in an assignment say A. For
all j ∈ N , define LS (j) = L (p) where p ∈ N 0 is such that iA (p) = j and S is the
relational structure associated with A.
Lemma 3 Consider a vertical hierarchy and an assignment A (with associated rela-
tional structure S). Let i and j be such that LS (i) > LS (j). Consider a permutation
π such that π (i) = j and π (j) = i and π(k) = k for each k ∈ N such that k 6= i, j.
Then, for all E ⊆ N such that E = K ∪ {i} for some K ⊆ N\{i, j}, we get
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
> 0.
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Furthermore, if K = ∅, then,
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
> 0.
Proof. Let us begin by considering non-empty K. Let the highest level among all
members of K in assignment A be given by lK . Namely,
lK = max {LS (i) |i ∈ K} .
Since in a vertical hierarchy, no two players have the same level, lK 6= LS (i) 6= LS (j).
We can discern three cases:
Case 1: lK < LS (j) < LS (i)
In this case, |ζπ(S)(E)| = LS (j) + 1 and |ζS(E)| = LS (i) + 1. Therefore,
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
=
1
LS (j) + 1
− 1
LS (i) + 1
=
(LS (i)− LS (j))
(LS (j) + 1) (LS (i) + 1)
> 0.
Case 2: LS (j) < lK < LS (i)
In this case, |ζπ(S)(E)| = lK + 1 and |ζS(E)| = LS (i) + 1. Therefore,
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
=
1
lK + 1
− 1
LS (i) + 1
=
(LS (i)− lK)
(lK + 1) (LS (i) + 1)
> 0.
Case 3: LS (j) < LS (i) < lK
In this case, |ζπ(S)(E)| = lK + 1 and |ζS(E)| = lK + 1. Therefore,
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
=
1
lK + 1
− 1
lK + 1
= 0.
If finally, K = ∅, E = {i} and
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
=
1
LS (j) + 1
− 1
LS (i) + 1
=
(LS (i)− LS (j))
(LS (j) + 1) (LS (i) + 1)
> 0.
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Finally, we can use Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 to arrive at the following result.
Theorem 1 If the TU cooperative game belongs to the class C∗ and the hierarchy is
vertical, a complete assignment is optimal if and only if it is cogent.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, consider a complete assignment A (with relational
structure S) that is optimal but not cogent. Then, there must be at least two agents i
and j such that LS (i) > LS (j) but v (i) > v (j). Consider an assignment that swaps
these two agents in these positions, namely an assignment B with relational structure
π(S) where π (i) = j and π (j) = i and π(k) = k for each k ∈ N such that k 6= i, j.
Then, the payoﬀ of the top agent changes by
ϕT (A)− ϕT (B) =
X
E=K∪{i}
K⊆N\{i,j}
[∆v(E)−∆v(π (E))]
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
. (9)
We shall prove that this change ϕT (A)−ϕT (B) is strictly positive. Consider∆v(E)−
∆v(π (E)) where E = K ∪ {i} and K ⊆ N\{i, j}. Now, ∆v(E) − ∆v (π (E)) =
∆v(K ∪ {i}) − ∆v (K ∪ {j}). Given v (i) > v (j) and the cooperative game (N, v)
belongs to the class C∗, it follows that ∆v(K ∪ {i}) −∆v (K ∪ {j}) > 0. Since the
hierarchy is vertical, by Lemma 3, we get
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
> 0.
Since the product of two non-negative terms is non-negative, it follows that ϕT (A)−
ϕT (B) is a sum of non-negative terms and hence is non-negative. To prove that it is
positive, we need only prove that one of the terms in the sum of non-negative terms is
positive, namely, there exists E such that [∆v(E)−∆v(π (E))]
h
1
|ζπ(S)(E)| −
1
|ζS(E)|
i
>
0. Take E = {i}. Then, using Lemma 3, we get
[∆v(E)−∆v(π (E))]
"
1
|ζπ(S)(E)|
− 1|ζS(E)|
#
= (v ({i})− v ({j}))
·
(LS (i)− LS (j))
(LS (j) + 1) (LS (i) + 1)
¸
> 0.
Hence, ϕT (A) − ϕT (B) > 0. Hence, A cannot be optimal. Hence, an optimal
hierarchy is cogent. The converse is obvious since a cogent hierarchy is uniquely
defined.
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6 Bidding for Positions
6.1 The Two Agent Model
In this section, we shall analyse the situation where two players bid for position in
a vertical hierarchy and we arrive at some rather interesting results. Suppose we
consider a vertical hierarchy with just two levels and two agents to fill these two
levels. The hierarchy is given in the figure below.
T
P1,,1
P2,1
Figure 1
Let the productivity of the two agents be given by µ1 and µ2 where µ1 > µ2.
We restrict ourselves for time being to the additive game. The permission value
associated with position p is given by ϕp. Now there are two possible assignments
which we refer to as B and C. We depict them below. B is cogent while C is not.
T
1
2
Assignment B
Figure 2
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T2
1
Assignment C
Figure 3
In assignment B, the permission values of the three agents are as follows:
ϕT (B) =
µ1
2
+
µ2
3
;
ϕ1 (B) =
µ1
2
+
µ2
3
;
ϕ2 (B) =
µ2
3
.
In assignment C, the permission values of the three agents are as follows:
ϕT (C) =
µ1
3
+
µ2
2
;
ϕ1 (C) =
µ1
3
;
ϕ2 (C) =
µ1
3
+
µ2
2
.
While the top agent would like a cogent hierarchy, there may be an information asym-
metry in the sense that he may not be aware of the productivities of the agents. If
he knows which agent is more productive, he can assign them in the designated posi-
tions. Hence, for a genuine problem, we shall assume an extreme form of asymmetry
namely, he is not aware of which agent is more productive in the first place. Let us
start with the most simple mechanism, namely, workers submits bids and the person
with the highest bid gets the higher position. If the bids are identical, then the tie
is broken by tossing a coin. Hence, for an assignment A, if bi is the bid for agent i,
then payoﬀ of agent i is
πi = ϕi (A)− bi.
Of course, the assignment that will result is a function of the bids. Therefore,
πi (b1, b2) = ϕi (A (b1, b2))− bi
if b1 6= b2; where
A (b1, b2) =
½ B if b1 > b2;
C if b1 < b2; .
18
On the other hand, if b1 = b2, then,
πi (b1, b2) =
1
2
ϕi (B) +
1
2
ϕi (C)− bi.
We shall assume that bids take place in increments of ε starting from zero. Further-
more, all the permission values constitute valid bids. Namely, for any permission
value ϕi, there exists a positive integer K such that ϕi = K · ε. ε is a suﬃciently
small positive real number.
6.2 Best Response Correspondences
We begin by showing that matching a bid is a “never best reponse” strategy.
Lemma 4 Let the best response correspondence of player i be given by Ri (b−i) given
that the other player bids b−i. Then,
b−i /∈ Ri (b−i) .
Proof. Suppose player i bids b−i. Then, his payoﬀ is given by
1
2
ϕi (B) +
1
2
ϕi (C)− b−i. (10)
If on the other hand, he bids b−i + ε, his payoﬀ is
ϕi (B)− b−i − ε (11)
if i = 1 and
ϕi (C)− b−i − ε (12)
if i = 2.
Start with i = 1. ϕ1 (B)−ϕ1 (C) =
µ1
6
+
µ2
3
> 0. Now, (11) is greater than (10) if
1
2
[ϕ1 (B)− ϕ1 (C)]− ε > 0
or,
µ1
12
+
µ2
6
> ε.
Assuming ε is suﬃciently small, this will be the case. The proof for i = 2 is similar.
The best response bids will fall into two categories. Either a player will bid zero
or a player will bid ε higher than his rival. The next lemma proves this.
Lemma 5 For any arbitrary b−i, Ri (b−i) ⊂ {0, b−i + ε}.
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Proof. We prove the lemma for i = 1. The proof for i = 2 is similar. Given that
the player is never bid b−i by Lemma 4, there are two possibilities. Either bi > b−i
or bi < b−i. Consider the first case. In this case,
πi = ϕi (B)− bi.
The payoﬀ is strictly decreasing in bi and hence, the maximum payoﬀ is obtained by
minimizing bi subject to the constraint that bi > b−i. This is precisely b−i + ε.
Next, consider the case bi < b−i. In this case,
πi = ϕi (C)− bi.
Again the payoﬀ is decreasing in bi and so is maximized by choosing the minimum
feasible bi which is zero.
Next, we focus on which of the two bidding strategies will be chosen given a certain
bid by the other player. This is shown by the next lemma.
Lemma 6 There exists a certain critical threshold Bi for player i such that:
(i) If b−i < Bi, then Ri (b−i) = {b−i + ε} .
(ii) If b−i > Bi, then Ri (b−i) = {0} .
(iii) If b−i = Bi, then Ri (b−i) = {b−i + ε, 0} .
Proof. We prove the lemma for i = 1. The proof for i = 2 is similar. From Lemma
5, player i will either bid b−i+ε or, zero. The payoﬀs are respectively ϕi (B)− b−i−ε
and ϕi (C). Hence,
ϕi (B)− b−i − ε > ϕi (C)
⇔ b−i < ϕi (B)− ϕi (C)− ε.
Similarly,
ϕi (B)− b−i − ε < ϕi (C)
⇔ b−i > ϕi (B)− ϕi (C)− ε.
Finally,
ϕi (B)− b−i − ε = ϕi (C)
⇐⇒ b−i = ϕi (B)− ϕi (C)− ε.
Hence, assuming Bi = ϕi (B)− ϕi (C)− ε, the lemma is proven.
Now,
B1 = ϕ1 (B)− ϕ1 (C)− ε
=
µ1
6
+
µ2
3
− ε
and
B2 = ϕ2 (C)− ϕ2 (B)− ε
=
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε.
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6.3 The Simultaneous Bidding Game
Consider the bidding game where both players bid simultaneously. We begin by
showing that this game does not admit a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 7 The simultaneous bidding game does not admit a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose a Nash equilibrium (b∗1, b∗2) exists. Then,
b∗2 ∈ R2 (b∗1) and
b∗1 ∈ R1 (b∗2) .
We consider three separate cases.
Case 1: Suppose b∗1 = 0. Then, b∗2 ∈ R2 (b∗1) = R2 (0) = {ε}. But R1 (b∗2) =
R1 (ε) = {2 · ε} and 0 /∈ R1 (ε) which is a contradiction.
Case 2: Next, suppose b∗2 = 0. We can arrive at a contradiction by a method
similar to Case 1.
Case 3: Suppose b∗1 6= 0 and b∗2 6= 0. By Lemma 5, b∗1 = b∗2 + ε and b∗2 = b∗1 + ε
simultaneously which is an impossibility.
The diagram below given further insights into the non-existence of a Nash equi-
librium. We plot the best response correspondences and find that there is no point
of intersection between them.
b1
b2
R2
R1
εµµ −+=
63
21
2B
εµµ −+=
63
12
1B
Figure 4
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6.4 The Sequential Bidding Game
Next, we consider sequential bidding. Suppose 1 bids first followed by 2. First, 1’s
profit function is given by
π1 (b1, b2) =



ϕ1 (B)− b1
1
2
ϕ1 (B) +
1
2
ϕ1 (C)− b1
ϕ1 (C)− b1
if b1 > b2;
if b1 = b2;
if b1 < b2.
Now, given that 1 is the first mover, he anticipates 2’s moves from her reaction
function, and hence we can replace b2 by elements of R2(b1) where R2(b1) derived
earlier was given by:
R2 (b1) =



{b1 + ε} if b1 < µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε
{b1 + ε, 0} if b1 = µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε
{0} if b1 > µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε
.
Therefore, 1’s profit function is given by
bπ1 (b1) = π1 (b1, R2 (b1)) =



ϕ1 (B)− b1
π (ϕ1 (B)− b1) + (1− π) (ϕ1 (C)− b1)
ϕ1 (C)− b1
if b1 >
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 <
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε.
⇒ bπ1 (b1) =



µ1
2
+
µ2
3
− b1
π
³µ1
2
+
µ2
3
´
+ (1− π)
³µ1
3
´
− b1
µ1
3
− b1
if b1 >
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 <
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε.
where π is some real number such that 0 6 π 6 1 representing an arbitrary probabil-
ity. Treating the three possibilities of (13) as three cases, in each case the payoﬀs are
decreasing in b1. So, we can restrict attention to only those possibilities where the
value of b1 is the minimum feasible number. This gives rise to the following payoﬀ
function.
bπ1 (b1) =



µ1
2
+
µ2
3
− µ1
3
− µ2
6
π
³µ1
2
+
µ2
3
´
+ (1− π)
³µ1
3
´
− µ1
3
− µ2
6
+ ε
µ1
3
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
;
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 = 0.
=



µ1
6
+
µ2
2
π
³µ1
6
+
µ2
2
´
− (1− π)
³µ2
6
´
+ ε
µ1
3
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
;
if b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε;
if b1 = 0.
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Two fact emerge from (13). First, 1 will be averse to bidding b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
−ε because
bidding ε higher will almost always yield a higher (expected) payoﬀ.2 Second, given
µ1
6
+
µ2
2
< µ1
3
, in equilibrium he will bid zero. 2 will bid ε. We summarize this result
in the form of a lemma below.
Lemma 8 In the bidding game where 1 is the first mover and 2 bids second, there is
an unique SPNE in which 1 bids zero and 2 bids ε. The assignment that results is C.
The surplus extracted is ε.
The next case we will handle is sequential bidding where 2 is the first mover. The
reaction function of 1 derived earlier is given by:
R1 (b2) =



{b2 + ε} if b2 < µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε
{b2 + ε, 0} if b2 = µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε
{0} if b2 > µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε.
.
Therefore, 2’s profit function is given by (π is a real number such that 0 6 π 6 1),
bπ2 (b2) = π2 (R1 (b2) , b2) =



ϕ2 (C)− b2
π (ϕ2 (C)− b2) + (1− π) (ϕ2 (B)− b2)
ϕ2 (B)− b2
if b2 >
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 <
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε.
⇒ bπ2 (b2) =



µ1
3
+
µ2
2
− b2
π
³µ1
3
+
µ2
2
− b2
´
+ (1− π)
³µ2
3
− b2
´
µ2
3
− b2
if b2 >
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 <
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε.
⇒ bπ2 (b2) =



µ1
3
+
µ2
2
− b2
π
³µ1
3
+
µ2
2
´
+ (1− π)
³µ2
3
´
− b2
µ2
3
− b2
if b2 >
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 <
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε.
2There is an extreme case where player 2 actually chooses π = 1 (or suﬃciently close to 1) in
which case bidding b1 =
µ1
3
+
µ2
6
− ε actually gives a higher payoﬀ. But that does not alter our
overall result.
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Again, since the payoﬀs are decreasing in b2, we restrict ourselves to situations where
b2 is the minimum feasible number. Therefore,
bπ2 (b2) =



µ1
2
+
µ2
6
π
³µ1
3
+
µ2
2
´
+ (1− π)
³µ2
3
´
− µ2
3
− µ1
6
+ ε
µ2
3
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
;
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 = 0.
=



µ1
2
+
µ2
6
π
³µ1
2
+
µ2
6
´
− (1− π)
³µ1
6
´
+ ε
µ2
3
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
;
if b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
− ε;
if b2 = 0.
Since
µ1
2
+
µ2
6
>
µ2
3
, the optimal strategy for 2 is to bid b2 =
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
.3 Player 1
bids zero again. We summarize this in form of the following lemma.
Lemma 9 In the bidding game where 2 is the first mover and 1 bids second, there
is an unique SPNE in which 1 bids zero and 2 bids
µ2
3
+
µ1
6
. The assignment that
results is C. The surplus extracted is µ2
3
+
µ1
6
.
So, we get quite a perverse result in the sense that sequential bidding always
results in a non-cogent hierarchy. However, there is one interesting fact. If the top
agent is aware of the productivities, he can in eﬀect still organize a sequential bidding
in which 2 moves first. Even though the hierarchy that results is non-cogent, the loss
(which amounts to
µ1
6
− µ2
6
) is smaller than the surplus extraction as a result of the
bidding.
7 Conclusion
We have therefore shown that where payoﬀ is determined by the permission value in
regular hierarchies under additive games, cogent and eﬃcient hierarchies coincide and
the result can be extended to non-additive games with appropriate restrictions on the
value function. We also study auctioning these positions using a bidding mechanism
in simple hierarchies and these always result in a non-cogent hierarchy.
Topics for further research include what auction mechanism can result in a cogent
hierarchy and whether the result can be extended to more complicated hierarchies.
Also, implications for the size of the firm may be studied. Williamson (1967) study
a model in which control reduces with increasing hierarchical firm depth and this
3There is a possibility of winning ε more by bidding ε less but the risks are quite high and the
additional return is too low to warrant this strategy.
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determines the size of the firm. Ruys and van den Brink (1999) study a model similar
to others where workers are also paid the permission value in regular hierarchies.
However, only the workers in the front positions are productive and all other members
of the hierarchy earn positional rents from those workers. The depth of the hierarchy
is then determined by the reservation wage. Similar issues can be studied in our
model.
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